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Corporate Inversions: New Chalenges, New Opportunities 
 
Dr. James N. Mohs1, Martin A. Goldberg, J.D., LL.M.2, Lanzi W. Butler, 
M.S.T.3 & Amanda M. Heath, M.S.T. (Candidate)4 
 
Abstract 
 
 With a wave of recent tax inversion and corporate reorganization discussions, 
corporate tax strategy has begun to move to the forefront of media, public and 
Congressional atention. These high-profile inversion strategies have gained 
momentum and achieved heightened atention, becoming a mater of public policy 
mater in 2014. While corporate international tax strategies have existed since the 
dawn of the U.S. federal income tax, inversions in their curent form have been 
active only since the 1980s. Using three predominate inversion cases as a lens; this 
research intends to fil a gap in the existing literature relating to corporate inversions. 
By combining existing case law, tax legislation, and Treasury regulations, this paper 
develops a framework for supporting strategic global tax initiatives. The conclusions 
and recommendations reached are generalizable and appropriate for use in 
developing best practice solutions. 
 
 Keywords: Tax inversions, Debt recharacterization, Inversion cases, corporate 
reorganizations 
 
I. Introduction 
 The corporate inversion, also caled tax inversion, is a tax-planning technique 
that arose out of a distinctive feature of the United States income tax law. That 
feature is that worldwide income of U.S. corporations is subject to U.S. income tax 
regardless of where earned. 
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While the vast majority of countries, including the other G-7 nations, have 
territorial systems that only tax their respective domestic income, the U.S. stands 
virtualy alone in its insistence on taxing income earned beyond its borders. 
(Matheson, 2013) Under Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), Code 
secs. 951-965, this income includes the income of foreign corporations controled by 
domestic corporations. Although there are diferent forms that the corporate 
inversion can take, the common format is a merger between a domestic and foreign 
corporation that would be tax-free as a corporate reorganization as defined in Code 
sec. 368, where the foreign corporation ended up as the parent of the domestic 
corporation. Because the U.S. Corporation is a subsidiary of foreign parent, rather 
than the other way around, the foreign-earned income of that parent would not be 
subject to U.S. income taxes. The corporate inversion then, did nothing to do reduce 
the U.S. taxation of income earned domesticaly, but would eliminate U.S. taxation on 
foreign-earned income. 
 
Once this relationship was established to keep the foreign parent’s foreign-
earned income free from U.S. taxes, additional savings would be sought by “earnings 
stripping.” This would mean reducing the taxable income of the domestic subsidiary, 
typicaly through interest payments to the foreign parent. The U.S. has the third-
highest corporate tax rate in the world. (Tax Foundation, 2015). So, the benefit of this 
technique would be to move income from a higher-taxed jurisdiction to a lower-taxed 
one. The current administration long considered this opportunity to save U.S. taxes 
an unwarranted loophole in need of being closed. (White House, April 18, 2016) 
Although no comprehensive approach has been taken to address corporate 
inversions, separate statutes and regulations have put limitations on the ability to take 
advantage of corporate inversions as originaly used, most recently final and 
temporary regulations published October 21, 2016 (Internal Revenue Service Final, 
Temporary Rules) that limit the availability of interest payments used for earnings 
stripping by recharacterizing certain debt as equity. 
 
1. Background 
 
The seminal case in establishing the basic viability of the corporate inversion 
was Bhada v. Commissioner, 892 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1989). This case confirmed the tax 
treatment sought by the taxpayers in a corporate inversion involving McDermot, 
Inc., a global engineering company specializing in complex ofshore oil and gas 
construction. 
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At the time of its inversion, McDermot was incorporated in Delaware and 
based in New Orleans. Its wholy owned subsidiary and I.R.C. § 957 controled 
foreign corporation McDermot International Inc. (“MII”) was based in Panama and 
served as the holding company for McDermot’s foreign operations. 
 
The McDermot Case 
 
In October 1982, McDermot executed its historic inversion by ofering an 
exchange of its own common stock for cash and common stock of MII. MII 
efectively purchased its parent, using its own stock as the currency. In doing so, 
McDermot “inverted” into its own Panamanian subsidiary, making MII the new 
parent. At the time, inversions were unknown and far from a public policy issue and 
McDermot were not subtle in its oficial reasoning for the reorganization. 
 
In its ofering prospectus to shareholders for the MII shares, management 
stated outright, “The principal purpose of the reorganization is to enable the 
McDermot Group to retain, reinvest and redeploy earnings from operations outside 
the United States without subjecting such earnings to United States income tax.” 
McDermot’s inversion was chalenged by the Service in Bhada v. Commissioner but 
ultimately prevailed, and MII continues to operate under this structure to this day. For 
another decade, the inversion landscape remained quiet. Then in 2002, a swarm of 
corporations performed “naked” inversions via a similar procedure to Helen of Troy, 
with alterations. The “naked” distinction is to denote that the inversions were not 
completed via merger with an external corporation, but were simply an internal 
reorganization seemingly for tax reasons. 
 
The Valeant Case 
 
In September of 2010, U.S.-based Valeant Pharmaceuticals Inc. engaged 
Canadian pharmaceutical company Biovail Corporation in a merger, with the intent to 
relocate Valeant to Canada. At the time, Valeant was roughly twice the size of Biovail 
as measured by market capitalization, making certain the legacy Valeant shareholders 
would own more than fifty percent of the merged entity and therefore realize built-in 
gains under Sec. 367(a) and Reg. 1.367(a)-3(c). 
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Since shareholders of both corporations had to approve the merger and 
Valeant had significant built-in gains, this cost would have put the transaction in 
jeopardy. To sidestep this roadblock, Valeant devised a clever scheme: prior to the 
merger, Valeant took on debt to pay an enormous special dividend to its 
shareholders—$16.77 per Valeant share, against a then-stock price of $26.35.  The 
special dividend served two purposes. One, it dramaticaly reduced the market value 
of Valeant; enough such that subsequent to the merger, legacy Valeant shareholders 
owned a 49.5% continued interest in the combined entity; just under the fifty percent 
threshold for realizing gains. 
 
While Reg. 1.367(a)-3(c) contains rules against inflating the value of the 
foreign corporation to achieve the same result, it provides no reciprocal rule against 
reducing the U.S. Corporation’s value. Second, it efectively served as backdoor cash 
consideration for the acquisition, as the dividend formaly qualified as a distribution 
under Sec. 301 and not as consideration paid for Valeant stock in the merger. This 
alowed the formal consideration for the merger to be entirely for stock at a pre-
determined exchange ratio, qualifying as a nontaxable reorganization under Sec. 
368(a).  While the merger heavily indebted Valeant, it nonetheless succeeded in 
avoiding the influences of Sec. 367(a) and Sec. 7874(a) and (b), and despite Biovail 
being the larger acquirer, the merged entity changed its name to Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. shortly after. 
 
Aided by the tax advantages of its new Canadian residency, Valeant has since 
reorganized their main operating subsidiaries in Barbados and Switzerland, which 
hold its intelectual property and generate the vast majority of its income. Due to net 
operating losses and other deferred tax assets, and a GAAP loss of pre-tax income in 
2011, Valeant’s efective tax rate is not calculable with certainty. However, some 
media outlets and investment banking analyst reports have estimated tax rates of 
between 4.8 and 6.4%, which is roughly confirmed by Valeant’s 2011 cash flows from 
operations of $676 milion and income tax expense (before tax asset benefits) of $40 
milion (5.8%). 
 
Under the leadership of CEO Michael Pearson, who has a reputation as a 
clever dealmaker, and somewhat aided by its tax advantages, Valeant has subsequently 
pursued an aggressive acquisition strategy, and its stock price has appreciated 
incredibly since the 2010 inversion. 
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The Philip Morris Case 
 
Philip Morris International Inc. (PMI) has ideal circumstances for an 
international taxation and inversion case study. While PMI is incorporated in Virginia, 
its revenues and income are generated entirely outside of the U.S. Representing an 
extreme in terms of its proportional international domestic income, PMI arguably 
stood to gain from a tax inversion transaction under current tax law. As a major 
operator in a heavily taxed industry, PMI is an enormous contributor to treasury 
departments worldwide. In 2014, PMI paid an astounding $50.3 bilion in excise taxes, 
dwarfing its U.S. federal income tax expense of $3.1 bilion, and realized a 29.1% 
efective income tax rate. This rate does not include deferred tax liabilities on 
approximately $23 bilion in retained earnings held in foreign subsidiaries.i Given the 
modern advent of Sections 367 and 7874, PMI’s options for an inversion are limited, 
particularly considering the built-in gains tax imposed by Sec. 367. The consolidated 
nature of the tobacco industry also limits prospective merger partners for executing a 
Valeant-like inversion. 
 
As part of a rebranding to highlight that its business portfolio had grown 
beyond tobacco, the company renamed itself Altria Group, Inc. at the holding 
company level in 2003. To maximize shareholder value, Altria pivoted towards 
separating its U.S. and non-U.S. tobacco business, and de-diversifying to remove the 
assets weighing down the high return on capital of its core tobacco business. In 2007, 
Altria spun of Kraft Foods (which itself included General Foods) and one year later, 
spun of Philip Moris International to its shareholders in Sec. 355(a) tax-free stock 
distributions, retaining only the U.S. tobacco assets and a minority holding in 
SABMiler. 
 
Government Reactions 
 
The leading alteration was to establish legal “tax residency” in the obscure 
Caribbean island nation of Barbados, despite that the corporations had formaly 
reincorporated in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and other wel-known tax havens. 
The use of Barbados for tax residency was to capitalize on the then-unnoticed U.S.-
Barbados tax treaty enacted between the two countries in 1984. 
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The Barbados treaty alowed corporate residents to claim benefits for reduced 
U.S. withholding tax rates by virtue of being publicly traded, even if the company’s 
shares were traded on a U.S. stock exchange and the company had no more economic 
presence in Barbados than a mailbox. It also alowed some U.S. source income to be 
obfuscated through the use of deductible interest on inter-company debt, royalties on 
intelectual property and the subtle manipulation of transfer pricing.  Bermuda’s rise 
as a reinsurance hub also alowed for more cash flow transfers via insurance 
premiums to move ofshore, where such payments are not only deductible, but are 
not U.S. source income to the parent of the reinsurer entity. 
 
Until this point, the U.S. Government’s most efective backstop against 
inversions was the tol charge of gain recognition posed by Reg. 1.367(a)-3(c). But as 
this 2002 wave painfuly showed, shareholder-level taxation is not always a significant 
friction cost. The substantial price declines in U.S. stock markets folowing the Dot-
Com Bubble in 2000-2002 greatly depressed the built-in gains of the time. Also, 
directors and management could lessen this tax burden for themselves by holding 
stock-based compensation such as stock options, instead of actual shares.  This 
provided a motivation even if it penalized minority shareholders. For the naked 
inverters, the discounted present value of expected recurrent tax savings overwhelmed 
the one-time tol charge. 
 
The U.S. Government responded to this flood of inversions in austere 
fashion. First, the Treasury negotiated a protocol amending the Barbados treaty to 
eliminate the benefits claimed by recent inverters, which Congress approved in 2004. 
Then Congress promulgated I.R.C. § 7874, which remains the most comprehensive 
statutory atack on inversions to date. 
 
 
The most relevant conditions of Sec. 7874 direct the Service to treat a new 
foreign parent to a U.S. corporation as a U.S. corporation for tax purposes, unless 
either the legacy U.S. corporation shareholders own less than eighty percent of new 
parent, or the new parent demonstrates it has a substantial business presence in its 
new incorporated jurisdiction. The Treasury later provided guidance on the 
substantial business presence doctrine in 2006, which outlined both a “facts and 
circumstances” test, and a safe harbor test to determine if the new foreign domicile is 
legitimate. 
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Despite these measures taken, which appear comprehensive, corporate 
inversions continued. In the decade folowing the Barbados protocol, most of the 
corporations that once claimed Barbados tax residency moved again in 2008-2009 to 
Switzerland and Ireland to take advantage of those countries’ U.S. tax treaties (US 
Barbados, 1984). Having successfuly inverted already, and without further protocols 
to amend the other treaties, these inversions continue unchecked to this day. Others 
atempted naked inversions claiming to meet the safe harbor test and avoid Sec. 
7874’s influence. The Treasury then patched that loophole in 2009 by removing the 
safe harbor exception.  Once done, Sec. 7874 efectively kiled the naked inversion, 
leaving inversions only possible via merger. 
 
2. Recharacterizion of Debt as Equity 
 
While it is stil possible to create a successful tax inversion, there are stil limits 
to the benefit. One of the limitations can be seen in recent tax regulations designed to 
curb the ability of inverted corporations to do earnings stripping by making 
deductible interest payments from the domestic subsidiary to the foreign parent. Code 
sec. 385, enacted in 1969, authorized the Treasury Department “…to prescribe such 
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest in a 
corporation is to be treated for purposes of this title as stock or indebtedness (or as in 
part stock and in part indebtedness).” One of the main efects of a recharacterization 
of debt as equity would be to deny the deductibility of payments made as interest, as 
these would be recharacterized as non-deductible dividends. 
 
Other efects would be that payments purported to be repayment of principal 
could be recharacterized as taxable dividends, and there may need to be an adjustment 
to calculations based on stock ownership, such as rules related to net operating loss 
limitations. After publishing proposed regulations under sec. 385 on April 8, 2016, the 
Treasury Department published final, temporary rules on October 21, 2016.  The 
main thrust of the final, temporary rules is that certain debt instruments issued after 
April 4, 2016 would be recharacterized as equity (Sec. 1.385-3 of the Final, Temporary 
Rules, at page 72960ff) where there are entities in an “expanded group.” An expanded 
group is the same as an afiliated group under Code sec. 1504(a), with three 
modifications: First, an expanded group includes both foreign and tax-exempt 
corporations. It also includes corporations held through controled partnerships. 
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Second, Code sec. 304(c)(3) atribution rules apply when determining related 
entities. The third modification states that corporations would be treated as a member 
of an expanded group if 80 percent of the vote or value is owned by expanded group 
members similar to Code sec. 1504(a)(2) 80- Percent Voting and Value Test. 
 
Under Reg. sec. 1.385-3, a debt instrument wil be recharacterized as equity if 
the debt instrument is issued by a member of an expanded group to another member 
of the group, caled an expanded group instrument or “EGI,” in any of the folowing 
transactions: 
 
1. A distribution, such as a dividend under Code sec. 301 or a redemption 
under Code sec. 302; 
2. An exchange for expanded group stock, such as debt received in a Code 
sec. 304 exchange or a triangular reorganization; or 
3. An asset reorganization where a shareholder of a member of the expanded 
group receives the debt instrument in exchange for stock. 
 
A debt instrument wil also be so recharacterized if issued to fund any such 
transaction. (Sec. 1.385-3 of the Final, Temporary Rules, at page 72960f). It should 
be noted, however, the Final Regulations are more limited in their impact than the 
regulations as originaly proposed. The first update is that S corporations, as wel as 
non-controled regulated investment companies known as “RICs” and real estate 
investment trusts known as “REITs” are excluded from an expanded group. 
 
The second update prevents brother-sister groups with non-corporate 
ownership to be treated as expanded groups. The prevention is a result of the 
determination by the “indirect” ownership that is now created by the modified 
atribution rules that do not integrate a downward atribution. In addition, expanded 
groups must include a domestic corporation. The rules at this time would not apply to 
transactions between two foreign corporations, even if both are members of an 
expanded group with a domestic corporation. Although the authorization in Code sec. 
385 that was given to the Treasury Department to create rules for recharacterizing 
debt as equity had only a few false starts until 2016, this does not mean that there 
have been no rules applicable to the subject. Case law going back years, up to the 
present, has created a body of rules related to the recharacterization of debt as equity. 
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In the case of Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 476, 493 (1980), 
the Tax Court summarized the factors cited in prior cases to include: …the names 
given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; presence or absence of a fixed 
maturity date; source of payments; right to enforce payments; participation in 
management as a result of the advances; status of the advances in relation to regular 
corporate creditors; intent of the parties; identity of interest between creditor and 
stockholder; "thinness" of capital structure in relation to debt; ability of corporation 
to obtain credit from outside sources; use to which advances were put; failure of 
debtor to repay; and risk involved in making advances. The continued viability of 
these factors is confirmed in the new rules, which state that “…whether an interest in 
a corporation is treated for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code as stock or 
indebtedness (or as in part stock and in part indebtedness) is determined based on 
common law, including the factors prescribed under such common law.” (Sec. 1-385-
1(b) of Internal Revenue Service Final, Temporary Rules). 
 
The regulations also provide for extensive documentation requirements, but 
these are only efective for debt instruments issued on or after January 1, 2018. (Sec. 
1.385-2 of the Final, Temporary Rules, at page 72952f).  The documentation 
supporting the expanded group instrument (referred to as “EGI”) must show that 
there is an obligation to pay a sum certain, that the creditor has al the rights of a 
creditor to enforce payment, that at the time the instrument was executed there was a 
reasonable expectation that the obligation would be met (including the value of 
colateral securing non-recourse obligations). 
In short, the documentation requirements, although extensive, do not appear 
to create any new substantive standards that did not already exist under prior case law. 
The first $50 milion of indebtedness is exempt from the new regulations. It is not 
clear whether they would also be exempt from the common law rules, although this 
might be a practical efect. Two things stand out as takeaways from this recent 
regulatory activity: First, the common-law criteria are stil valid, and in the case of a 
corporate inversion the Internal Revenue Service now has elaborate documentation 
rules to assist it in applying those rules. Second, where there is indebtedness from a 
U.S. corporation to a related foreign corporation, it wil be recast as equity, but only if 
the indebtedness arose from a reorganization-type transaction that did not actualy 
increase the business operations of the foreign corporation. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
U.S. corporations are continuing to undertake corporate inversions to foreign 
domiciles for the purposes of unlocking significant tax savings to the corporations 
and their respective shareholders and thus eroding the U.S. corporate tax base. 
Inversion transactions have occurred since their dawn in the early 1980s despite 
repeated tax code legislation to prohibit them. The recent high-profile proposals have 
spawned public discussion for more comprehensive reform. 
 
Based on the principles advanced in the above cases, it can conclude that 
inversions are stil possible in limited forms. The most efective appears to be via 
merger with a foreign business whereby the legacy U.S. shareholders own less than 
eighty percent of the merged entity. This may not avoid gain recognition under Sec. 
367(a) and Reg. 1.367(a)-3(c) as Valeant case ilustrates, but avoids the far harsher 
punishment of being treated as a U.S. corporation for tax purposes under Sec. 
7874(a). This has led tax critics to claim that Sec. 7874 is not particularly efective at 
curbing inversions, as a merger with a modestly sized foreign company could avoid its 
influence. 
 
The 2016 rules were intended to close what the current administration 
perceived as an unwarranted loophole available through corporate inversions. But 
ultimately, they addressed only the very narow issue of earnings stripping, more 
narrowly that of interest deductions, and more narrowly stil only the interest 
deductions that arose from corporate distributions and restructuring that wasn’t part 
of corporate expansion. This is no diferent that prior laws and regulations which 
placed limits on, and made special rules applicable to, corporate inversions, but did 
not in any way invalidate the underlying tax rationale. 
 
Thus, the promised closing of the corporate inversion loophole is something 
that is yet to happen. The opportunity for the benefits from corporate inversions stil 
remain, they are however subject to the costs and limitations that have developed 
over the years. 
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